Abstract-We model peer-to-peer live streaming as a multistage congestion game where certain strategy restrictions allow, at equilibrium, to minimize both streaming duration and congestion. We also propose a distributed algorithm (ConGaS) that can be easily executed at peers, enabling them to coordinate toward streaming optimization. Finally, ConGaS is compared against two other dissemination policies through experimental evaluation, and simulations confirm the viability and efficacy of the former.
I. INTRODUCTION
Live streaming is among the most interesting applications in distributed systems, because of the great interest shown by customers, the consequent attention paid by software companies, and also due to the raised technical challenges to factually develop them. Essentially, the concern is with those many situations where some media content is produced and distributed in time. One new content unit is periodically generated by a source (or broadcaster) and made available to a set of interested users, with the main requirement that units must be timely disseminated to all users. That is, such distribution should guarantee that the delay between the generation of a novel media content, and its reception at a given user, is kept within a limited amount of time, and with small variance of such delays across different units and different users.
While actual commercial solutions resort to classic, nonscalable centralized approaches where the broadcaster acts as a media server that dispatches all produced contents to all users, another interesting and promising architectural solution is to employ a P2P (peer-to-peer) scheme, allowing peers to share their possessed units, in order to fasten the content distribution process [1] , [2] . Streaming P2P approaches disseminate the data by creating specifically designed overlay networks, which can be conceived in alternative ways. Peers can be logically organized as a tree, where data flow from the root or broadcaster to the leaves, a multi-tree [2] , or a generic mesh [3] . Further approaches also exploit DHTs for content distribution, e.g. [1] .
The design of a distributed system for the support of live streaming applications involves three main issues: i) the overall load due to forwarding activity should be evenly shared among the participants; ii) the time needed for full dissemination should be minimized; and iii) the protocol should be fair in that the expected time needed to receive the whole content should be the same across all peers. Game theory is recently proving very useful for modeling communication systems and dynamic distributed environments. Methods and results coming from these studies allow to identify effective solutions while also taking into account all these three issues i)-iii).
Game modeling has been used in mechanism design for live content distribution mostly in terms of payment schemes and incentive-based approaches [4] . As for routing, models commonly resort to congestion (or, more generally, potential) games [5] . Here, we model live streaming as a multistage congestion game, with a P2P approach. Cooperation is not achieved through a structured framework (as usual). Rather, coordination emerges at equilibrium in a game-theoretical protocol, clearly distinguishing between the number of stages needed for full dissemination on the one side, and stage-wise congestion on the other. Most importantly, the model identifies a strategy restriction mechanism which at each stage prevents peers from asking certain content units, given the prevailing content distribution over the population. With restrictions, at equilibrium both streaming length and stage-wise congestion are minimized. This is shown through a distributed algorithm ConGaS (i.e. Congestion Games for Streaming) that we develop for implementing the proposed equilibrium selection method. The proposed approach is compared with average equilibrium outcomes (i.e. where strategy restriction is relaxed). In addition, ConGaS is also compared to a basic gossip protocol for content dissemination. An extended treatment of the model and results proposed here can be found in [6] .
II. MULTISTAGE CONGESTION GAME MODELING

A. Background
In our round-based time modeling, stream production occurs over a finite time-sequence t = 0, 1, . . . , T . The source (denoted 0) provides one new unit c t of content at each stage/round t. Denote by N = {1, . . . , n} the set of peers, with N 0 = {0, 1, . . . , n}. Stream distribution may be modeled as a multistage game, which is representable as a tree, whose nodes correspond to a moment at which at least one player has to take action and where paths from the origin to a leaf correspond to distinct courses the game may take. A main assumption is perfect information: when asked to take action, at any time t, all players know exactly what node has been reached at t (in the sequel we show how to factually implement this through the distributed algorithm). A strategy, for a player or peer, specifies an (admissible) action to take at each node. has received up to t. For every i ∈ N , a strategy specifies, for each game tree node C t , some j ∈ N 0 from whom to ask, in round t, a content unit c t , 0 ≤ t ≤ t. These strategies are finite sequences as long as some upper bound T * on duration exists.
Let G denote the set of all game tree nodes, i.e. the family of all possible content distributions over peers that may be reached along some game course, under Ru1-3, but independently from what game courses prevail, and at what time. In our model, a strategy A i for peer i ∈ N has form A i : G → N 0 , with A i (C) = j = i denoting the one j ∈ N 0 from whom i asks to receive at game tree node C ∈ G.
B. Congestion Games
In a congestion game form [5] there is a set N of players and a set M of facilities, and each player i ∈ N has a set 
The game is monotone when each a ∈ M has an associated utility function u a : Z + → R + satisfying u a (k) < u a (k ) whenever k > k , and each i ∈ N gets a payoff given by the sum over all the chosen facilities a ∈ A i of the corresponding utility:
Finally, a congestion game form (and any game derived from it) is symmetric when the strategy set is the same across players:
n . P2P streaming systems may be approached through congestion games with facilities being players themselves: every
is the number of peers who at C ∈ G ask to receive from i ∈ N 0 some content that this latter has but they miss 1 .
1 If a peer asks to receive from someone who has no additional content, then such a request is simply ignored by the system: it causes null congestion. A request is valid if it contributes to congestion.
Denote by κ = |G| the whole number of game tree nodes. A strategy A i for i ∈ N can be regarded as a point A i ∈ N κ 0 , as it specifies somebody to ask from at each C ∈ G that may be reached. The corresponding congestion game form is
Players' payoffs π i : N κn 0 → R + are a sum over C ∈ G of a per-node utility received at each game tree node. This utility depends on prevailing content distribution (i.e. the reached game tree node C itself), and on profile A 1 (C), . . . , A n (C) of per-node strategies chosen by players at C. Hence, per-node utilities may depend on congestion, which is the number of other peers i ∈ N with the same (valid) per-node strategy
. This turns live streaming into congestion games where facilities are pairs (j, C) ∈ N 0 × G. Formally, the payoff π i (A) of any profile A to a peer i is
An equilibrium is a profile A from which no player has an incentive to (unilaterally) deviate.
C. Best-case and Worst-case Equilibrium
A simple indicator of streaming efficiency is its length (or number of rounds needed for full dissemination). If the number of peers is n = 2 m for some natural m, then with rules Ru1-3 a content unit can reach the whole population no faster than through m + 1 (consecutive) rounds. In fact, as peers can send/receive a content unit per round while the source is allowed to distribute that unit only once to a single peer, after the source transmits the unit to a given peer (this costs one round) the number of peers that possess that unit can at most double each round. Hence the lower bound for a single unit distribution is log 2 n = m rounds. A crucial fact is that all the T + 1 content units of a stream may be distributed to all peers in exactly m + 1 rounds. Still, in view of Ru1-3 this can only be achieved if whenever a peer receives a unit c t in round t + k, this peer forwards c t to other peers for the remaining m − k rounds. As a consequence, being already involved in the distribution of c t , during these rounds this peer cannot receive units to be further forwarded. That is, during each of these remaining m − k rounds the peer can receive only a unit that completes its distribution at that round, being among those 2 m−1 who are the last ones to receive that unit. This not only is feasible, but can be obtained through many different streaming trees or game courses.
In general, we assume that transitions from one game tree t-node C t to t + 1-nodes C t+1 may be stochastic: a generic strategy profile A does not yield a unique game course, but a probability distribution over game courses. Whatever its form, an underlying probabilistic model essentially decides who gets what when multiple peers (validly) ask to receive from a common j ∈ N 0 . It is not hard to see that fastest streaming game courses are sustainable at equilibrium, for any underlying probabilistic model. Hence the best-case (or shortest) equilibrium streaming length is T + m + 1 (see [6] ).
Given the P2P setting, where peers always satisfy precisely one (randomly selected) valid request among those received, in each round the number of distributed units equals the number of those who are asked to forward through some valid request. At equilibrium such a number equals the minimum between the number of those who have some units that someone else is missing and the number of those who miss some unit. Claim: the upper bound for equilibrium streaming length is T * = T + 2 m + 1. (See [6] for proofs and discussions). Although worst-case equilibrium streaming length is linear in both the whole number of produced units and the whole number of peers, it can be rather longer than the optimal one, hence unfeasible for live streaming applications.
D. Strategy Restriction
Equilibrium profiles A result in game courses with streaming length ranging from the optimal (i.e. minimum) one T + m + 1 to the worst-case one T + 2 m + 1, and with congestion σ 
. Given previous history, if a peer in t has some content unit c t−k that must be forwarded in round t + 1, then in this round t the peer cannot ask to receive from those j ∈ N 0 who in t have units c t−k to be also forwarded in round t + 1 (i.e. such that t − k + m > t). Mechanism Rm1-2 exploits selfish behavior toward socially desirable outcomes; it is simple as specifies conditions only in terms of the generic node reached through game course. Any profile which is an equilibrium with restriction Rm1-2 results in a fastest streaming game course.
III. CONGAS
From our use of Congestion Games for Streaming, a distributed algorithm (referred to as ConGaS) attaining fastest streaming is now developed. For reasons of space, it is detailed for a number of peers which is a power of two (n = 2 m ), the generic case requiring additional procedures.
Given the assumption of perfect information (see above), each peer can constantly observe the game course (i.e. what units other peers are sending/receiving in each round). Clearly enough, using communication protocols to achieve this global updating at each round is non-viable (because of time and bandwidth constraints). A viable solution is to let peers share a seed for randomly generating same sequences of pseudorandom numbers. This provides coordination by randomly selecting who receives any forwarded unit.
In the initialization of ConGaS, the broadcaster (i.e. node 0) sends to all peers a generated seed value. In the distribution loop, each iteration t corresponds to the production, at the broadcaster, of a novel unit c t to distribute. Meanwhile, on-going units c At each iteration t, each peer can receive a single unit. This is achieved by picking nodes from auxiliary list NextFree, initialized to N (line 2) and subsequently emptied by different calls of MANAGEDISTRIBUTION() (line 7). Given a unit c k being distributed (t − m ≤ k ≤ t), a bijection between those who have it (senders S k ) and (some of) those who do not (receivers R k ) is provided. Thus, for any unit, at each h-th step of distribution, 2 h nodes have the unit and 2 h are selected to receive it. Once the distribution of ongoing units is specified, a new unit is produced (lines 11-13) and MANAGEDISTRIBUTION() is called again. In MAN-AGEDISTRIBUTION() a new receiver recv is identified thought NEXTRECV(). MUSTSEND() schedules the delivery of the unit from sender p to recv. Also, recv is added into S k (the list of c k senders; line 4). Accordingly, recv is removed from R k (as well as from the list of those who may be selected as receivers of ongoing content units; lines 5-6). NEXTRECV() randomly selects receivers: a (novel) node is picked until someone is found in the intersection of NextFree and AvailRecvs (i.e. the set of those who have not already been selected). Finally, MUSTSEND() makes identified senders actually send on-going units, based on the nodes' id.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
ConGaS performance has also been evaluated through a dedicated simulator modeling evolution of the distributed 4: until n ∈ NextFree ∩ AvailRecvs 5: return n system with varying communication protocols, which provide the needed benchmark. In artificial intelligence, the general issue is known as the price of anarchy or the price of stability, depending on whether the social optimum is compared with the worst or else with the best equilibrium outcome. In fact, ConGaS actually selects a subset of equilibria, hence the aim to compare such equilibria (average) outcome with respect to the average over all equilibria. Basically, these latter average equilibrium outcomes (referred to as "equilibrium") is implemented simply by ignoring restriction Rm1-2. Hence, at any t ≥ 0, each i ∈ N who still misses some unit randomly selects some valid forwarder j ∈ N 0 , if any, and then receives the oldest unit in C t j \C t i . If the number of receivers exceeds that of forwarders, the probability of being among those who receive (and thus also that of being among those who do not) is the same for all potential receivers. Finally, ConGas is also compared with a basic gossip protocol (referred to as "disequilibrium"), where not only Rm1-2 is ignored, but also congestion and coordination failures can cause a peer to miss one or more slots, receiving nothing over those rounds.
Our metrics for comparing the three considered schemes are latency (measured in rounds) and its jitter. Latency Λ ∈ R + is such that, by picking at random both a peer and a unit c t , the former receives the latter (on average) in round t + Λ. Jitter is the variance across peers of the average latency (over all units) they experience during the whole streaming. Figure 1 shows the behavior of the three compared streaming protocols/algorithms with a fixed number 2 8 of peers and The gap between optimal equilibrium, generic equilibrium and disequilibrium is substantial. Figure 2 shows that latency (average) standard deviation is much less with ConGaS than otherwise, with equilibrium performing much better than disequilibrium. Another significant result is that dispersion is minimal with ConGaS, while it is notable with the other two P2P exchange mechanisms. We claim this is an important result for the implementation of viable live streaming systems, as it corresponds to a jitter reduction.
